History dependence without unstable steady state: A non-differentiable framework. by Hartl, R.F. & Kort, P.M.
History dependence without unstable steady state:
a non-di⁄erentiable framework.
Richard F. Hartl (corresponding author)
Institute of Management, University of Vienna,
Br￿nnerstra￿ e 8, A-1210 Vienna, Austria
Richard.Hartl@univie.ac.at
Tel. +43-1-4277-38091, Fax. +43-1-4277-38094
Peter M. Kort
Department of Econometrics and CentER, Tilburg University,
P.O. Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlands
Kort@kub.nl, and





In this paper, a non-di⁄erentiability is identi￿ed as a new mechanism that
creates history dependence in dynamic economic models. A unique characteristic
is that this occurs although no unstable steady state exists. This is shown by
studying a capital accumulation model in which the revenue function exhibits a
kink. It can be expected that history dependence will occur in other models with
non-di⁄erentiabilities as well.
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21 Introduction
Recent work on dynamic economics has stressed the fact that economic outcomes may
be history-dependent. The term history-dependence has been made popular by the work
of W.B. Arthur describing economic paths of new technologies that exhibit increasing
returns and positive feedbacks (see, e.g., Arthur 1989, 1994). Positive feedbacks may
arise locally, and can already be found in early models in development economics using
convex - concave production functions. From the onset it has been recognized that
such convex-concave production functions may imply multiple steady states - usually,
two saddle-points and one unstable middle steady-state in between. As a consequence,
the long-term behavior of the economy will be history-dependent. According to the
conditions prevailing in the ￿rst phases of development, the economy will converge to
either one or the other saddle-point. Consequently, there exists a threshold where the
dynamics leading to these two di⁄erent long-term solutions separate. Following the
pioneering articles of Skiba (1978) and Dechert and Nishimura (1983), such thresholds
have been occasionally called ￿ Skiba points￿in the economic literature (see, e.g., Brock
and Malliaris, 1989, and Feichtinger and Hartl, 1986). Recently, these thresholds have
often been called DNS-points because of the contributions of Dechert, Nishimura and
Skiba to the discovery of this phenomenon of thresholds.
History-dependence means that, depending on the initial conditions, the optimal solu-
tions of the dynamic system considered converge towards two or more distinct attractors.
These attractors can be saddle-points or boundary equilibria such as the origin (if the
feasible state-space is bounded by non-negativity conditions). In higher-dimensional
models, limit cycles may also occur as attractors. The existence of two or more steady-
3states usually implies the existence of at least one unstable steady-state. Furthermore,
the existence of optimal paths converging to di⁄erent attractors implies the existence
of a threshold, i.e. of a DNS-point, on which the decision-maker is indi⁄erent between
choosing one of these optimal paths.
A common denominator of most existing contributions in this area is that a non-
concavity is introduced to explain history-dependent outcomes. Although there are
several economic characteristics leading to ￿ convexities￿with respect to a state, ￿ increas-
ing returns￿dominates by far. The hypothesis of increasing returns is picked up also in
other areas, e.g. in regulatory economics and in endogenous growth theory pioneered
by Romer (1986); see also Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1995), Ciccone and Matsuyama
(1996), or Santos (1999). Of course, increasing returns are capable of generating history-
dependent outcomes too, even for the e¢ cient, i.e. ￿ planned￿ , economy; see Matsuyama
(1991) and Ladron-de-Guevara et al. (1999).
In this paper we identify a yet unknown mechanism that causes the occurrence of history
dependence. In particular we show that a non-di⁄erentiability with respect to the state
variable in a dynamic economic problem can also be a source for multiple long run
equilibria. A remarkable characteristic of the resulting solution is that this history
dependence appears without simultaneous occurrence of an unstable steady state. To
the best of our knowledge this is a completely new feature. We apply the well known
capital accumulation framework to make our point but our analysis is not restricted to
this application area.
The paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 contains the general analysis of a capital
accumulation model. The existence of the DNS-point is veri￿ed in a linear quadratic
4framework in Section 3, and Section 4 concludes.
2 General Analysis
It is convenient to adopt the capital accumulation framework for our model. Let the
state k denote the capital stock and the control u be the investment rate. The revenue
function is given by r(k) while the investment costs are c(u). The discount rate is ￿






￿￿t [r(k) ￿ c(u)]dt; (1)
_ k = u ￿ ￿k; k(0) = k0; (2)
where labor is assumed to be proportional to capital stock so that it does not need to be
explicitly included. The function c(u) includes the costs of acquisition and adjustment
costs. It is convex and increasing in u; i.e., c(0) = 0; c0 > 0; c00 > 0: The function r(k);
with r(0) = 0; is increasing, r0 > 0; while the second order derivative is negative, r00 < 0:
So far everything is standard; see, e.g., Lucas (1967) and Gould (1968).
The new element we introduce is that at one point, k = ￿, the function r is not di⁄er-
entiable in such a way that the ￿rst order derivative jumps upwards: r0 (￿+) > r0 (￿￿):
The interpretation, for instance1, can be that the ￿rm has the possibility to produce
using some old software or technology that the ￿rm owns, which gives revenue r1 (k).
1An alternative interpretation would be that when capital stock and, in turn, production is low,
only the home market is served. If the production rate is larger it pays for the ￿rm to serve a second
market but then a ￿xed cost per unit of time is incurred because of, e,g, new outlets, new personnel,
etc.
5In addition, the ￿rm has the option to license or subscribe to a new software or tech-
nology which makes capital stock more productive, in the sense that it leads to a higher
revenue r2 (k) as well as a higher marginal revenue, r0
2 (k) > r0
1 (k). It is only cost
e⁄ective to do so if the capital stock is su¢ ciently large, because of the existence of
a ￿xed license or subscription fee, g: Then, it holds that r1 (￿) = r2 (￿) ￿ g and that
r0 (￿+) = r0
2 (￿) > r0
1 (￿) = r0 (￿￿) so that
r(k) = r1 (k) for k ￿ ￿ and
r(k) = r2 (k) ￿ g for k > ￿.
Pontryagin￿ s maximum principle is used to obtain the necessary optimality conditions.
The Hamiltonian is
H = r(k) ￿ c(u) + q[u ￿ ￿k]
which leads to [see Clarke (1983)]
@H=@u = 0 i.e. c
0 (u) = q: (3)
and
_ q = ￿q ￿ @H=@k = (￿ + ￿)q ￿ r
0 (k): (4)
Since Huu < 0, maximization of the Hamiltonian yields a unique solution. It follows
that u is continuous over time (see Feichtinger and Hartl 1986, Corollary 6.2).





0 (u) ￿ r
0 (k)]: (5)
The above di⁄erential equations (4) and (5) are not valid for k = ￿: There, the Hamil-
tonian is non-di⁄erentiable and Clarke￿ s (1983) maximum principle prescribes that the
adjoint equation is replaced by the di⁄erential inclusion
_ q 2 [(￿ + ￿)q ￿ r
0
2 (￿);(￿ + ￿)q ￿ r
0
1 (￿)]: (6)

















We continue by applying the phase diagram analysis in the state-control space. The
dynamic system is given by (2) and (5). The _ k = 0 isocline, u = ￿k; is upward sloping.








(￿ + ￿)c00 < 0 for k 6= ￿:
while it exhibits an upward jump at k = ￿:
From the above results on the shape of the isoclines it follows that one or two positive
equilibria can exist. These equilibria are always saddle point stable. This follows from
the general observation that an equilibrium is a saddle point if and only if the derivative















5 < 0 i⁄
du
dk















￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
_ u=0
;
because @_ k=@u = 1 > 0 and @ _ u=@u = ￿ + ￿ > 0: Since we already found that the
_ k = 0-isocline is increasing and the _ u = 0-isocline is decreasing, both steady states are
saddle points. Usually, between two saddle points one would expect an unstable steady
state. Here, this is not the case and we will demonstrate that the kink in the revenue
function at k = ￿ plays the same role as an unstable steady state.
We are interested in the case where two steady states exist. Proposition 1 identi￿es the
scenario in which this happens.










The proof directly follows from (2) and (7). The corresponding phase diagram is depicted
in Figure 1.
Insert Figure 1 about here
At k = ￿ the jump in the _ u = 0 isocline occurs and thus the trajectories exhibit a kink
there. The bold lines represent the optimal policy functions while the dotted lines are
candidates which are not optimal. The thin solid lines are the unstable branches or
other trajectories of the dynamical system and the dash-dotted lines are the isoclines.
As can be inferred from Figure 1, there are two candidate long run equilibria, ￿ kL and
8￿ kH. For initial values of capital stock lower than kLB it is always optimal to converge
to ￿ kL, while convergence to ￿ kH always occurs for k0 > kUB. In the ￿ overlap region￿
between kLB and kUB there are two solution candidates, because either convergence to
￿ kL or convergence to ￿ kH is possible.
Using the same arguments as in Dechert (1983), in the ￿ overlap region￿between kLB
and kUB a unique threshold kDNS can be identi￿ed where the ￿rm is indi⁄erent between
the two candidate policies. Then, for initial values of capital stock lower than kDNS it is
always optimal to converge to ￿ kL, while convergence to ￿ kH always occurs for k0 > kDNS.
Note that ￿contrary to Dechert (1983) ￿this threshold exists in the absence of an
unstable steady state.
Figure 1 covers the case that the overlap region does not contain one of the two steady
states, i.e., ￿ kL < kLB < ￿ < kUB < ￿ kH. The following proposition explains that in the
remaining cases where two steady states exist, only one of them is a long run optimal
equilibrium.
Proposition 2. If a steady state is contained in the overlap region, convergence to that
particular steady state can never be optimal.
Proof. It is known from Dechert (1983) that the minimum of the Hamiltonian H for a
￿xed value of k is reached at the _ k = 0 isocline. Furthermore the value of the objective
functional evaluated at any point of a bounded solution candidate equals H=￿; see Michel
(1982). Now consider e.g. the situation where at ￿ kL a solution candidate converging to
￿ kH exists. Then from the above we can conclude that this solution candidate o⁄ers a
higher value of the objective than the other solution candidate which is staying at ￿ kL.￿
In the next section we treat an example in which the above results are illustrated while
9most values can be computed analytically.
3 Example
Following Barucci (1998) we assume quadratic revenue and cost functions. The di⁄er-
ences are that the second order derivative of the revenue function is negative and we




2; aHk ￿ bk
2 ￿ g
￿
; c(u) = cu + du
2:
We require all parameters aL, aH, b, c, d, g, ￿, and ￿ to be positive and aL < aH:
The characteristic values of the capital stock, for which revenue r(k) reaches its maxi-








We restrict ourselves to the scenario where revenue is increasing in the relevant region
0 < k < kmax, implying that:
g <
aL (aH ￿ aL)
2b
: (10)
In this case the _ k = 0-isocline is the upward sloping straight line u = ￿k and the




[ai ￿ (￿ + ￿)c ￿ 2bk]; (11)
10where ai equals aL for k < ￿; and aH for k > ￿; respectively. There is an upward jump
of size
aH￿aL
2d(￿+￿) at k = ￿.
The steady states must satisfy:
￿ ki =
ai ￿ (￿ + ￿)c
2￿d(￿ + ￿) + 2b
: (12)
for i = L;H. In order to have multiple steady states, we impose aL > (￿ + ￿)c; because
otherwise ￿ kL becomes negative. It is easily obtained that ￿ kL < ￿ < ￿ kH holds i⁄
(aL ￿ (￿ + ￿)c)(aH ￿ aL)
2￿d(￿ + ￿) + 2b
< g <
(aH ￿ (￿ + ￿)c)(aH ￿ aL)
2￿d(￿ + ￿) + 2b
: (13)
and that values of g in this interval automatically satisfy (10).
Apparently, in each of the two regions k < ￿ and k > ￿ the canonical system formed by
(2) and the isocline _ u = 0 is linear and can be solved analytically. Following Hartl and
Kort (2000), we obtain that
k = ￿ ki +
￿




u = ￿￿ ki +
￿




where ￿1 is the negative eigenvalue of the Jacobian of the dynamic system (2) and the









From (14) and (15), we also obtain analytical expressions for the candidate policy func-
11tions (saddle point paths), showing that the saddle point paths are decreasing straight
lines:
u = ￿￿ ki +
￿
k ￿ ￿ ki
￿
(￿ + ￿1) (17)
We now investigate the location of the DNS-threshold and establish the following result.




￿￿ kH + ￿ kL
￿
(aH ￿ aL), then kDNS < k




￿￿ kH + ￿ kL
￿
(aH ￿ aL), then kDNS = k




￿￿ kH + ￿ kL
￿
(aH ￿ aL), then kDNS > k








H ￿ ￿ k2
L
￿
(aH ￿ aL) ￿ 2d￿
2
1
￿￿ kH ￿ ￿ kL
￿ (19)
Proof. Here we only give an outline of the proof, which can be found in full detail
in Hartl and Kort (2002). First, we compute the objective values ￿L when starting
from k0 < ￿ converging to equilibrium ￿ kL and ￿H starting from k0 > ￿ converging to
equilibrium ￿ kH. This yields
￿￿L (k) =
￿



































1 ￿ g: (21)
Equating these, and solving for k; yields (19). We note that k￿ is only an approximation
of the DNS point, since ￿L and ￿H only hold on one side of ￿. On the other side of ￿;
12the extension of this solution candidate yields a higher value of the objective function
since - because of the kink - revenue is, in fact, higher than assumed in ￿L and ￿H.
Thus, we know that kDNS < k￿ < ￿ if k￿ < ￿ and that kDNS > k￿ > ￿ if k￿ > ￿. Only
if k￿ happens to coincide with ￿, then kDNS = k￿ = ￿. The inequality k￿ Q ￿ can be
reformulated as (18a-c), which completes the proof. ￿
Note that ￿1 in (16) and thus also ￿ kH and ￿ kL do not depend on the parameter g which
can be chosen independently. Thus, for any given set of the other parameters, values of g
small enough lead to a situation that the smaller steady state, although strictly positive,
is no equilibrium since it is always optimal to converge to the larger steady state being
the only long run optimal equilibrium here. On the other hand, a su¢ ciently large g
will lead to the situation that k￿ > ￿ kH, implying that it is never optimal to converge to
the larger steady state. In the next subsection we provide a numerical example in which
the DNS-point occurs.
3.1 Numerical Examples
We now identify di⁄erent scenarios by choosing appropriate parameter values. Let us
assume aL = 5; aH = 10; b = 0:1; d = 1; ￿ = 0:2; ￿ = 0:1; and c = 1: From (10) we need
g < 125 to have the revenue function increasing for k < ￿.
3.1.1 Two equilibria
To consider the case of two equilibria, we choose g = 110: This gives the characteristic
values kmax = 50; ￿ = 22; ￿ kL = 14:688; ￿ kH = 30:313; and k￿ = 20:234:
In Figure 2 we plot the phase diagram. At ￿ = 22 the jump in the _ u = 0 isocline occurs
13and thus the trajectories exhibits a kink there. Compared to Figure 1, we see that now
isoclines, policy functions and also the unstable paths are straight lines. This is caused
by the quadratic speci￿cations for revenue and investment cost functions.
Insert Figure 2 about here
From Proposition 3 we can derive that kDNS < k￿. We can now compute this DNS-point
kDNS by ￿rst obtaining the intersection of policy function uH with k = ￿. Next, we
can determine the hyperbola like trajectory belonging to the region k < ￿ and ending
in the point (k;u) = (￿;uH (￿)). This hyperbola like trajectory in question is vertical
when _ k = 0, which happens for kLB = 17:697; while the corresponding investment rate
is u = 3:5393. Capital stock kLB is the lower boundary of the overlap region. Similarly,
also the upper boundary kUB = 24:592 is obtained.
After computing the real value function ￿H for kLB < k < ￿, and intersecting it with
￿L; we obtain that kDNS = 19:884: More details of this derivation can be found in Hartl
and Kort (2002). In Figure 3, we plot all relevant value function candidates.
Insert Figure 3 about here
Note that in the interval [kLB;￿] the value function candidate ￿H representing solutions
converging to ￿ kH is not given by (21) but by a slightly larger value. In Figure 3,
this is represented by the bold dotted curve in [kDNS;￿] and the thin dotted curves in
[kLB;kDNS].
In the numerical example just presented, the DNS-point kDNS was smaller than the kink
14￿: From Proposition 3 we derive that for g = 112:5 DNS-point and kink coincide, where
￿ = k￿ = kDNS = 22:5. If g is decreased further, then the DNS-point kDNS will be
larger than the kink ￿:
3.1.2 Only one equilibrium
For su¢ ciently low values of g; the kink ￿ is smaller than the k-value of the intersection
point of the stable path belonging to kH and the unstable path corresponding to kL in
Figure 3. Consequently, the policy function corresponding to kH can be extended to the
left beyond kL: From Proposition 2 we now know that only the larger steady state is a
long run equilibrium. This occurs e.g. for g = 100; where ￿ = 20.
Analogously, for su¢ ciently high values of g; the kink ￿ is larger than the k-value of the
intersection point of the stable path belonging to kL and the unstable path corresponding
to kH in Figure 3. Then, the policy function corresponding to kL can be extended to the
right beyond kH so that only the smaller steady state is a long run equilibrium. This
occurs e.g. for g = 122; where ￿ = 24:4:
4 Conclusions and Extensions
Exploiting the framework of a capital accumulation model, it was established that non-
di⁄erentiability can be a source for multiple equilibria. Remarkable was that this occurs
while an unstable steady state does not exist. Within a numerical example we were
able to determine the exact value of the threshold, or DNS point, at which the decision
maker is indi⁄erent between choosing one of the optimal paths. As a general result
we established that a necessary condition for a stable steady state to be a long run
15equilibrium is that this steady state should not be part of an overlap region.
The result that a non-di⁄erentiability can lead to DNS points is clearly not restricted
to a capital accumulation framework. More generally, this phenomenon can occur in
any dynamic economic model due to a jump in the costate isocline caused by a non-
smoothness of some model function.
References
[1] Arthur, W.B., 1989, Competing technologies, increasing returns, and lock-in by
historical events, The Economic Journal 99, 116-131.
[2] Arthur, W.B., 1994, Increasing Returns and Path Dependence in the Economy
(University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor).
[3] Barro, R.J. and X. Sala-I-Martin, 1995, Economic Growth (McGraw-Hill, New
York).
[4] Barucci, E., 1998, Optimal investments with increasing returns to scale, Interna-
tional Economic Review 39, 789-808.
[5] Brock, W.A. and A.G. Malliaris, 1989, Di⁄erential Equations, Stability and Chaos
in Dynamical Economics (North Holland, Amsterdam).
[6] Ciccone, A. and K. Matsuyama, 1996, Start-up costs and pecuniary externalities as
barriers to economic development, Journal of Development Economics 49, 33-59.
[7] Clarke, F., 1983, Optimization and Nonsmooth Analysis (Wiley-Interscience, New
York).
16[8] Dechert, W.D., 1983, Increasing returns to scale and the reverse ￿ exible accelerator,
Economic Letters 13, 69-75.
[9] Dechert, W.D. and K. Nishimura, 1983, A complete characterization of optimal
growth paths in an aggregated model with a non-concave production function,
Journal of Economic Theory 31, 332-354.
[10] Feichtinger, G. and R.F. Hartl, 1986, Optimale Kontrolle ￿konomischer Prozesse:
Anwendungen des Maximumprinzips in den Wirtschaftswissenschaften (de Gruyter,
Berlin).
[11] Gould, J.P., 1968, Adjustment costs in the theory of investment of the ￿rm, Review
of Economic Studies 35, 47-56.
[12] Hartl, R.F. and P.M. Kort, 2000, Optimal investments with increasing returns to
scale: a further analysis, in: E.J. Dockner et al., eds., Optimization, Dynamics,
and Economic Analysis: Essays in Honor of Gustav Feichtinger (Springer-Physica,
Berlin) 226-238 .
[13] Hartl, R.F. and P.M. Kort, 2002, Skiba without unstable equilibrium in a lin-
ear quadratic framework, POM Working Paper 7/2002, University of Vienna
(http://www.bwl.univie.ac.at/bwl/prod/papers/pom-wp-07-2002.pdf).
[14] Ladron-de-Guevara, A., S. Ortigueira, and M.S. Santos, 1999, A two sector model
of endogenous growth with leisure, Review of Economic Studies 66, 609-631.
[15] Lucas, R.E. jr., 1967, Optimal investment policy and the ￿ exible accelerator, In-
ternational Economic Review 8, 78-85.
17[16] Matsuyama, K., 1991, Increasing returns, industrialization, and indeterminacy of
equilibrium, Quarterly Journal of Economics 106, 617-650.
[17] Michel, P., 1982, On the transversality condistion in in￿nite horizon optimal prob-
lems, Econometrica 50, 975-985.
[18] Romer, P.M., 1986, Increasing returns and long-run growth, Journal of Political
Economy 94, 1002-1037.
[19] Santos, M.S., 1999, On non-existence of continuous markov equilibria in
competitive-market economies, presented at the 1999 meeting of the Society of
Economic Dynamics in Alghero, Sardinia, to appear in: Journal of Economic The-
ory.
[20] Skiba, A.K., 1978, Optimal growth with a convex-concave production function,
Econometrica 46, 527-539.
18List of Figure Captions
Figure 1. The phase diagram in case of two steady states.
Figure 2. The value function and the DNS-point in the quadratic example.
Figure 3. The phase diagram with two steady states in the quadratic example.
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